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Based on static analysis, a number of studies argue that forming a regional trade agreement 
(RTA)is more likely to raise welfare if member countries are “natural trading partners,” while 
other studies claim that the opposite is true. This paper looks at the argument from a dynamic 
viewpoint by examining the impact of North-South trade on technology diffusion and total 
factor productivity (TFP) in the South. Specifically, it examines the impact on TFP in the 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Poland of trade with Japan, Canada plus the United States 
(North America) and the European Union (EU). Using industry-level data, we find that i) 
technology diffusion and productivity gains tend to be regional: Korea benefits mainly from 
trade with Japan, Mexico with the United States, and Poland with the European Union; and ii) 
though these results suggest that the dynamic version of the “natural trading partners” 
hypothesis holds for all three countries, careful analysis shows that it holds for Korea and 
Mexico but not necessarily for Poland.    
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North-South Trade-Related Technology Diffusion and 
the Dynamics of the “Natural Trading Partners” Hypothesis 
 
1.  Introduction 
  A number of studies claim that if two countries or regions are “natural trading 
partners,” they are less likely to generate trade diversion and are more likely to gain 
from forming a regional trade agreement (RTA) between them. Two versions of the 
hypothesis exist, referring either to the large volume of trade between potential partners 
in an RTA or to the small distance and low transport costs between them. Both the 
volume-of-trade and the distance versions of the hypothesis are relevant to our analysis.  
Adherents of the “natural trading partners” hypothesis include Lipsey (1960), 
Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Summers (1991), Krugman (1993), Deardorff and Stern 
(1994), and the EU Commission (1995). Opponents of the hypothesis include Bhagwati 
(1993), Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), Krishna (2003), Panagariya (1997), Schiff 
(1997) and Michaely (1998). Schiff (2001) shows that neither the analysis of the 
adherents nor that of the opponents is correct because of a failure to take the relationship 
between the partner country and the rest of the world into account, and that no conclusion 
can be drawn one way or the other about the impact of being natural trading partners on 
the benefits of forming an RTA.  
The studies listed above were carried out in a static framework. This paper 
examines the “natural trading partners” hypothesis in a dynamic framework. Specifically, 
it examines the impact of trade on North-South technology spillovers and on TFP in the 
South. Given our interest in examining the differential impact of trade between natural 
and “non-natural” trading partners (whether in terms of volume of trade or in terms of 
distance), we divide the main developed countries of the OECD into three groups,   2
namely Japan, Canada plus the US (denoted by ‘North America’) and the EU, and select 
three countries in the South that are “natural trading partners” (NTP) of one of the three 
OECD regions: the Republic of Korea as an NTP of Japan, Mexico as an NTP of North 
America, and Poland as an NTP of the EU.  
Korea is closest to, as well as trades the most with, Japan, Mexico with North 
America, and Poland with the EU. We find that, in terms of productivity gains, Korea 
benefits mainly from trade with Japan, Mexico from trade with North America, and 
Poland from trade with the EU. These estimation results would seem to provide support 
for the dynamic version of the “natural trading partners” hypothesis for North-South 
RTAs. Careful analysis shows that this seems to be the case for Korea and Mexico but 
not necessarily for Poland.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth a brief 
analytical framework, Section 3 describes the data used, and Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 provides an interpretation of the results, Section 6 examines 
their implication for the NTP hypothesis, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Analytical Framework  
In the last decade, a literature has developed that examines the impact of trade on 
international technology diffusion and productivity. The theoretical basis for the 
approach used here is the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991) on endogenous growth 
in the open economy. The basic idea is that goods embody technological know-how and 
therefore countries can acquire foreign knowledge through imports.    3
Coe and Helpman (1995) provide an empirical implementation of Grossman and 
Helpman’s (1991) theory. They construct an index of “trade-related foreign R&D” 
consisting of the trade-weighted sum of trading partners’ R&D stocks. They estimate the 
impact of the index of foreign R&D on total factor productivity (TFP) for OECD 
countries plus Israel, and conclude that foreign R&D does have a large impact on TFP.  
That paper has inspired a lot of related research. Studies at the country level 
include Coe et al. (1997) for developing countries and Engelbrecht (1997), Keller (1998), 
Coe and Hoffmaister (1999), Lichtenberg et al. (1998) and Lumenga-Neso et al. 
(forthcoming) for OECD countries. Studies at the industry level include Schiff et al. 
(2002) for developing countries and Keller (2002a) for the OECD. A common finding in 
most of these studies is that trade promotes North-North and North-South technology 
diffusion.
1  
Coe and Helpman (1995) use aggregate import data. Such data include not only 
intermediate inputs and capital goods but also final consumer goods and agricultural 
commodities. The latter are unlikely to generate much, if any, technological knowledge 
diffusion. We use industry-level data, with all imports consisting of intermediate inputs 
and capital goods.     
This paper expands on Coe et al. (1997). We divide our 14 major OECD countries 
into three distinct regions, and examine whether these regions have differential effects on 
technology diffusion and productivity in some of their trading partners in the South, and 
whether these differential effects might be based on geography. 
   4
The three OECD regions are denoted by JPN for Japan, NA for North America 
(Canada + US), and EU.
2 For a given industry i in country c in year t, we define the trade-































a RD a NRD ,             (1) 
where N indexes the three OECD regions, k indexes the member countries of OECD 
region N,  c indexes Korea, Mexico and Poland, j indexes industries and t for year. 
The first part of equation (1) says that foreign R&D from region N in industry i in 
country c, 
N
cit NRD , is a weighted sum over all industries j of 
N
cjt RD , with weights  cij a  
equal to the share of imports of industry j in country c that is sold to industry i (proxied 
by the input-output share in the empirical implementation).  The second part of equation 
(1) says that 
N
cjt RD  is a weighted sum of R&D stocks
N
jkt RD  in member country k of  
OECD region N, with weights  cjt cjkt VA M —imports of industry-j products from country 
k per unit of industry-j value added in country c (i.e., its import concentration ratio).
3 
  Following Coe et al. (1997), we do not include domestic R&D stocks in the 
estimation equation. The reason is that R&D data at the industry level are not available 
for Korea, Mexico and Poland. As argued in Coe et al. (1997) and Schiff et al. (2002), 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Keller (1998) argues that whether trade patterns matter for technology diffusion is an open question. 
Based on the concept of ‘indirect’ technology spillovers, Lumenga-Neso et al. (forthcoming) provide an 
interpretation of Keller’s results which confirms the importance of trade for technological diffusion. 
2 The EU here includes Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
3 The trade weights here are similar to the ones in Lumenga-Neso et al. (forthcoming) and in Schiff et al. 
(2002), but different from those used in Coe and Helpman (1995) and Lichtenberg et al. (1998). Coe and 
Helpman use total imports as denominator in the trade weights in two regressions, the properties of which 
are discussed in Schiff et al. (2002). The latter use the ratio of imports over an industry’s value-added in 
their industry-level analysis. Lichtenberg et al. (1998) use the exporting country’s GDP as denominator 
while Lumenga-Neso et al. (forthcoming) use the importing country’s GDP as denominator. In our view,   5
given that well over 90% of all R&D spending takes place in the OECD countries 
considered, this is unlikely to bias our results.
4 Also following Coe et al. (1997), we 
estimate the equations in the first difference (rather than in the level) of the log of the 
variables to capture the impact of trade on TFP.
5  
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where  ∆ denotes first differences, NRD
JPN, NRD
NA and NRD
EU are defined in equation 
(1), Ec (Ii) (Dt) denotes country (industry) (year) dummies capturing country (industry) 
(year) fixed effects, and  cit ε  is a white noise error term. We would expect βJPN, βNA and 
βEU to be nonnegative, and if there is strong regional knowledge diffusion, βJPN to be the 
largest for Korea, βNA the largest for Mexico, and βEU the largest for Poland. 
 
3. Data Description 
The data set consists of three importing countries in the South—Korea, Mexico 
and Poland, 16 manufacturing industries, 14 OECD trading partners, and covers 21 years 
(1977-1997) for Korea and 19 years (1990-1998) for Mexico and Poland. The selection 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lumenga-Neso et al.’s measure for country-level analysis and Schiff et al.’s measure for industry-level 
analysis are more adequate for the analysis of the productivity effect of trade-related R&D.  
4 In 1990 (1995), 96% (94.5%) of the world’s R&D expenditures took place in industrial countries. 
Moreover, recent empirical work has shown that much of the technical change in individual OECD 
countries is based on the international diffusion of technology among OECD countries (Eaton and Kortum, 
1999; Keller 2002a). For instance, Eaton and Kortum (1999) estimate that 87% of French growth is based 
on foreign R&D. Since developing countries invest much fewer resources in R&D than OECD countries, 
foreign R&D must be even more important for developing countries as a source of growth.   
5 Education variables (such as the share of the population with a given level of education) are available and 
can be used as proxy for countries’ absorption capacity. However, this variable does not vary across 
industries (is correlated with industry dummies). Also, variations over time are small (and are zero in some   6
of the manufacturing industries, the OECD trading partners, and the year coverage is 
determined by data availability. The 16 manufacturing industries are either at the two- or 
three-digit level according to the International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC), 
revision 2.
6 
Data on total factor productivity (TFP), R&D stocks at the industry level for the 
14 OECD countries, bilateral trade shares and input-output tables are taken from Schiff et 
al. (2002), which is available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/trade. That paper 
provides detailed documentation on the construction of the above variables and some 
summary statistics. The summary statistics provided in this paper (Table 1) are the 
average bilateral trade shares and trade-related foreign R&D. 
  Table 1 shows that each developing country imports more from its Northern 
neighbor than from more distant OECD regions. On average over the period 1981-1998, 
out of its total imports from the three OECD regions, Poland imported 91% from the EU 
and Mexico imported 82% from North America, while Korea imported about 43% from 
Japan, 36% from North America and 21% from Europe.  
Thus, both in terms of trade volume and in terms of distance, Korea (Mexico) 
(Poland) is a “natural trading partner” of Japan (North America) (the EU). As for trade-
related R&D stocks, each developing country gets access to more of the technology from 
its Northern neighbor than from more distant OECD regions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
cases), and given that our estimation is in first differences, we decided not to include that variable in the 
estimation. 
6 They are: (1) 31 Food, Beverage & Tobacco; (2) 32 Textiles, Apparel & Leather; (3) 33 Wood Products 
& Furniture; (4) 34 Paper, Paper Products & Printing; (5) 351/2 Chemicals, Drugs & Medicines; (6) 353/4 
Petroleum Refineries & Products; (7) 355/6 Rubber & Plastic Products; (8) 36 Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products; (9) 371 Iron & Steel; (10) 372 Non-Ferrous Metals; (11) 381 Metal Products; (12) 382 Non-
Electrical Machinery, Office & Computing Machinery; (13) 383 Electrical Machinery and Communication 
Equipment; (14) 384 Transportation Equipment; (15) 385 Professional Goods; and (16) 39 Other 
Manufacturing.   7
4. Empirical  Results 
We now proceed with the estimation of the impact of trade-related technology 
diffusion from each OECD group on the TFP of each of the three Southern countries and 
examine whether these impacts vary by country and by OECD group. Estimation is 
carried out in first differences and with the White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. 
  Tables 2, 3 and 4 report, for Korea, Mexico and Poland, respectively, the impact 
on TFP of trade-related technology diffusion from each OECD region. Columns (i) to (vi) 
report the impact on TFP from NRD from individual OECD regions, while columns (vii) 
and (viii) report the joint impact on TFP from NRD from all three OECD regions. 
Coefficients for the constant and for the time and industry fixed effects are not shown. F-
tests indicate that year (industry) dummies need to (need not) be included in the 




Columns (i) to (vi) of Table 2 show that the elasticity of TFP with respect to NRD 
from Japan is .51 with industry fixed effects and .47 without their effects, both significant 
at the 5 percent level. The elasticity with respect to NRD from the EU is about .20 but is 
not significant. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, given that it accounts for 36.5% of 
Korea’s imports (Table 1), the elasticity with respect to NRD from North America is 
small and not significant.  
  Columns (vii) and (viii) report effects of NRD from the three OECD regions 
simultaneously. The elasticity of TFP with respect to NRD from Japan is about .47,   8
significant at the 5 percent level, while the elasticity of TFP with respect to NRD from 
North America and from the EU are small and not significant. The results in columns 
(vii) and (viii) confirm those in columns (i) to (vi).  
 
4.2. Mexico 
We first describe the results in columns (i) to (vi) of Table 3. The elasticity of 
TFP with respect to NRD from North America is equal to .55, significant at the 10 
percent level, while that with respect to NRD from Japan is not significant, and neither is 
that with respect to NRD from the EU.   
Columns (vii) and (viii) confirm the results obtained in columns (i) to (vi). The 
elasticity of TFP with respect to NRD from North America is .59, significant at the 10 
percent level, while that with respect to NRD from Japan is not significant, and neither is 
that with respect to NRD from the EU.  
 
4.3. Poland 
Starting with columns (i) to (vi) of Table 4, the elasticity of TFP with respect to 
NRD from North America is about 3.18, significant at the 5 percent level, that with 
respect to NRD from the EU is about 8.5, also significant at the 5 percent level, and that 
with respect to NRD from Japan is not significant. The elasticity with respect to NRD 
from the EU is close to 3 times larger than that from North America.  
Results in the last two columns confirm those in columns (i) to (vi), though with 
somewhat smaller elasticities for the EU and North America. The elasticity of TFP with 
respect to NRD from North America is equal to about 2.25 (significant at the 5% level),   9
about 6.4 with respect to NRD from the EU (significant at the 1% level), and not 
significant with respect to NRD from Japan. The elasticity with respect to NRD from the 
EU is again close to 3 times larger than that with respect to NRD from North America. 
 
4.4. Structural and Policy Changes 
A number of structural and policy changes occurred over the sample period. 
NAFTA was formed in 1994, the EU signed an FTA with Poland (Europe Agreement) 
in 1994, and the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1989. Dummy variables were 
interacted with the relevant NRD variables to examine whether the elasticity of 
Mexico’s TFP with respect to North America’s NRD changed after 1994 and whether 
that of Poland’s TFP with respect to EU’s NRD changed either after 1989 or after 1994 
or both. None of the variables were found to be significant. 
 
5. Interpretation of the Results 
The empirical results described above are striking. For each of the three 
countries in the South, the largest and most precisely estimated elasticity of TFP is the 
one with respect to NRD from its neighboring OECD region or “natural trading 
partner.” For Korea (Mexico), the only significant elasticity is the one with respect to 
NRD from Japan (North America). In the case of Poland, the elasticities with respect to 
NRD from both the EU and North America are significant, but the former is close to 3 
times as large as the latter. Thus, our results indicate that North-South trade-related 
technology diffusion  exhibits a regional pattern.    10
Why is the impact of  NRD from the neighboring OECD region so much bigger 
than that from the distant regions? One possibility is that trade between each country in 
the South and its OECD neighbor involves more than just a simple exchange of goods. It 
is likely to entail more personal interaction, including sub-contracting relationships where 
firms in the South import intermediate goods from firms in the neighboring OECD 
regions and export finished products back to the same firms. In that case, knowledge 
diffusion is associated not only with the knowledge-content of the imported goods but 
also with the close contacts associated with trade. These hands-on relationships are more 
likely to hold with neighboring OECD regions than with the more distant ones where 
arms-length relationships are more likely to prevail. 
A paper that is relevant to our analysis and supports our findings is Keller 
(2002b). He shows that knowledge is geographically localized in the sense that the 
impact of international technology diffusion on TFP declines with distance. This is 
precisely what we found in the case of North-South trade-related technology diffusion. 
 
6. Implications for the “Natural Trading Partners” Hypothesis 
  The question examined here is as follows: assuming that Korea, Mexico and 
Poland have decided to form an RTA with one of the three OECD regions and that they 
are free to form an RTA with whatever OECD region they prefer, which one should they 
choose? Our empirical results suggest that each Southern country should form an RTA 
with its neighboring OECD region. However, careful analysis shows that, though this is 
likely to be true for Korea and Mexico, it is less likely for Poland.   11
The calculation of the impact of an RTA on TFP requires a few steps. We start 
with Korea. Assume Korea forms an RTA with Japan, and that the increase in Korea’s 
imports from Japan associated with trade creation is equal to X percent. Assume also that 
the proportionate increase in imports is the same for all industries. Then, from equation 
(1), the increase in TFP is equal to .48X percent (with the elasticity of .48 taken from 
column (vii) of Table 2).
7  
Assume the increase in Korea’s imports from Japan associated with trade 
diversion is Y percent. This results in an increase in TFP of .48Y percent. Denote the  
value of the increased imports of Y percent by $YY. Under trade diversion, Korea’s total 
imports remain unchanged, so that imports from other countries than Japan must decline 
by exactly $YY. Given that the RTA between Korea and Japan discriminates against both 
the EU and North America, we assume that Korea’s imports from these two regions 
decline in the same proportion.
8 Korea’s imports from Japan amount to 42.9 percent of its 
total imports (Table 1). Thus, the Y percent increase in imports from Japan equal .429Y 
percent of Korea’s total imports, and equals (.429/.571)*Y or .75Y percent of Korea’s 
imports from the EU plus North America.
  
Given the assumption that Korea’s imports from the EU and North America 
decline in the same proportion, the decline in Korea’s TFP from the fall in imports is 
.14*.75*Y or .105Y percent (where the elasticity for the EU is .14 and the elasticity for 
North America is zero (column (vii), Table 2)). The net impact on TFP from trade 
                                                 
7 We choose the results of column (vii) rather than from column (viii) because of the higher adjusted R
2. 
However, whether we choose the results of column (vii) or (viii) has no impact on our conclusions. The 
same holds in the case of Mexico and Poland.  
8 This assumption does not affect our conclusion. Even if we assume that the EU, whose elasticity is larger 
than that from North America, is the source of the entire decline in imports, this would lead to a smaller 
TFP gain from trade diversion but would still not change our conclusions (see below).     12
diversion is  .48Y - .105Y or .375Y percent. Thus, the impact on Korea’s TFP of both 
trade creation (.48X) and trade diversion (.375Y) is positive, with the total impact on 
Korea’s TFP equal to .48X + .375Y.  
On the other hand, if Korea formed an RTA with the EU, it would result in a 
negative impact on TFP from trade diversion and a (most likely) smaller impact from 
trade creation (compare the TFP elasticity of .14 (zero) with respect to imports from the 
EU (North America) with that of .48 with respect to imports from Japan). With an RTA 
with North America, the impact of trade diversion would also be negative and there 
would be no impact of trade creation. These calculations indicate that the largest impact 
on Korea’s TFP obtains from an RTA with Japan, and that the dynamic version of the 
“natural trading partner” hypothesis holds for Korea.
9 
What about Mexico? First, note that the coefficient of trade-related R&D from 
Japan is negative but not significant in the regressions for both Mexico and Poland. 
Given that an increase in trade with a Northern region is unlikely to reduce productivity 
in the South, we set the coefficient equal to zero for both countries in the simulations.  
Now, assume Mexico forms an RTA with North America. Trade creation of X 
percent raises its TFP by .59X percent (column (vii), Table 3). The increase in imports 
associated with trade diversion of Y percent raises its TFP by .59Y percent. Given North 
America’s share in Mexico’s imports from the three OECD regions of 82 percent and that 
of the EU plus Japan of 18% (Table 1), the relative reduction in imports from the EU plus 
Japan is equal to (.82/.18)*Y = 4.56Y percent, and the decline in TFP due to the decrease 
in imports is .14*4.56*Y = 0.638Y percent, or an decrease in TFP of .638Y. The net   13
impact of trade diversion on TFP is .59Y -.638Y = -.048Y percent. Thus, the total impact 
on TFP is .59X - .048Y percent. Hence, unless trade diversion is at least 12.3 (.59/0.048) 
times larger than trade creation—which is highly unlikely (see footnote 10)—we 
conclude that the impact on Mexico’s TFP is positive.
10 
An RTA between Mexico and the EU or Japan would result in a negative impact 
on TFP from trade diversion and a (most likely) smaller impact from trade creation 
(compare the TFP elasticity of .59 with respect to imports from North America with one 
of .14 (zero) with respect to imports from the EU (Japan)). Thus, the dynamic version of 
the “natural trading partner” hypothesis seems to hold for Mexico as well. 
What about an RTA between Poland and the EU? The impact of trade creation of 
X percent on TFP is equal to 6.42X percent (column (vii), Table 4). The Y percent of 
trade diversion result in a positive impact on TFP of 6.42Y percent. The equi-
proportional reduction in imports from Japan and North America results in a decrease in 
TFP equal to (90.7/9.3)*(2.26)*Y = 22.04Y percent. Thus, the net impact on TFP from 
trade diversion is –15.62Y percent, and the total impact is 6.42X – 15.62Y percent. 
Whether the total impact on TFP of an RTA with the EU is positive or negative is 
ambiguous and depends on the relative magnitude of trade creation X and trade diversion 
Y. It is positive (negative) for X > (<) 2.43Y.  
What about an RTA between Poland and North America? The impact of trade 
creation of W percent is 2.26W percent. The impact of trade diversion of Z percent is 
2.26Z – (6.2/93.8)*(6.42)*Z = 1.84Z percent, with the total impact equal to 2.26W + 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 If the entire trade diversion were due to an decrease in imports from the EU, the fall in TFP would be 
equal to .14*(.429/.206)*Y = .29Y, and the net effect would be equal to .48Y - .29Y = .19Y percent. In 
other words, the results would be qualitatively unchanged.   14
1.84Z percent. The impact of trade diversion is positive in this case, though the impact of 
trade creation is likely to be smaller than with an RTA with the EU. Whether the impact 
on TFP of an RTA between Poland and North America (6.42X – 15.62Y percent) is 
larger than that between Poland and the EU (2.26W + 1.84Z percent) is unclear. In 
conclusion, whether the dynamic version of the “natural trading partner” hypothesis holds 
in the case of Poland is ambiguous.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examined the impact of trade-related technology diffusion from three 
developed OECD regions on productivity in Korea, Mexico and Poland. Using industry-
level data, the paper shows that trade-related technology diffusion and productivity gains 
in the three countries tend to be regional. In terms of productivity gains, Korea benefits 
mainly from trade with Japan, Mexico from trade with North America, and Poland from 
trade with the EU. These results would seem to provide support for the dynamic version 
of the “natural trading partners” hypothesis for North-South RTAs. However, careful 
analysis shows that this is likely to be the case for Korea and Mexico, though not 
necessarily for Poland. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Schiff and Wang (2003) estimate that trade diversion from Mexico joining NAFTA is at most equal to 
22% of trade creation.   15
 
References 
Bhagwati, J. 1993. “Regionalism and multilateralism: an overview.” Chapter 2 in De Melo, J. and 
A. Panagariya (eds.) New Dimensions in Regional Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press.  
_______ and A. Panagariya. 1996. “Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism—Strangers, 
Friends or Foes?” in Bhagwati and Panagariya (eds.) The Economics of Preferential Trade 
Agreements. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press. 
Coe, David T., and Alexander W. Hoffmaister. 1999. “Are There International R&D Spillovers 
Among Randomly Matched Trade Partners? A Response to Keller.” Working Paper 
WP/99/18. International Monetary Fund. 
Coe, David T. and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. “International R&D Spillovers,” European Economic 
Review 39 (5): 859-887. 
_____, Elhanan Helpman and Alexander W. Hoffmaister. 1997. “North-South R&D Spillovers.” 
Economic Journal 107: 134-149. 
Deardorff, A.V. and R.M. Stern. 1994. “Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Preferential Trading 
Arrangements.” Chapter 2 in Deardorff and Stern (eds.) Analytical and Negotiating Issues in 
the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Mich. Press. 
Engelbrecht, H.-J. 1997. “International R&D Spillovers, Human Capital and Productivity in 
OECD Countries: An Empirical Investigation.” European Economic Review 41: 1479-88. 
Eaton, Jonathan, and Samuel Kortum. 1999. “International Technology Diffusion: Theory and 
Measurement.” International Economic Review 40 (3): 537-70. 
EU. 1995. “Free Trade Areas: An Appraisal,” Communication from the EU Commission to the 
EU Council. 
Grossman, M. Gene and Elhanan Helpman. 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Keller, Wolfgang . 1998.  “Are International R&D Spillovers Trade-related? Analyzing 
Spillovers among Randomly Matched Trade Partners.” European Economic Review 42: 
1469-81. 
_____. 2002a. “Trade and the Transmission of Technology.” Journal of Economic Growth 7 (1):                              
5-24. 
_____. 2002b. “Geographic Localization of International Technology Diffusion.” American 
Economic Review 92 (1):120-42 (March). 
Krishna, Pravin. 2003. “Are regional trading partners ‘natural’?” Journal of Political Economy 
111: 202-226. 
Krugman, P. 1993. “Regionalism versus multilateralism: analytical notes.” Chapter 3 In De Melo, 
J. and A. Panagariya (eds.) New Dimensions in Regional Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press. 
Lichtenberg, Frank R. and Burno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. 1998. “International R&D 
Spillovers: A Comment.” European Economic Review 42: 1483-91.   16
Lipsey, R. 1960. “The theory of customs unions: A general survey.” Economic Journal 70: 498-
513. 
Lumenga-Neso, Olivier, Marcelo Olarreaga and Maurice Schiff. Forthcoming. “On ‘Indirect’ 
Trade-Related R&D Spillovers.” European Economic Review.  
Michaely, M. 1998. “Partners to a preferential trade agreement: Implications of varying size.” 
Journal of International Economics 46: 73-85. 
Panagariya, A. 1997. “Preferential trading and the myth of natural trading partners.” Japan and 
the World Economy 9: 471-89. 
Schiff, Maurice. 1997. “Small is Beautiful: Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of 
Country Size, Market Share, and Smuggling.” Journal of Economic Integration 12 (3): 359-
87.  
_______. 2001. “Will the Real ‘Natural Trading Partner’ Please Stand Up?” Journal of Economic 
Integration 16/2 (June).  
_______ and Yanling Wang. 2003. “NAFTA, Technology Diffusion and Productivity in 
Mexico.” Latin American Journal of Economics (Cuadernos de Economia): 469-76 (Dec.). 
_______, Yanling Wang and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2002. “Trade-Related Technology Diffusion 
and the Dynamics of North-South and South-South Integration.” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2861.  http://www.worldbank.org/research/trade. 
Summers, L. 1991. “Regionalism and the world trading system,” in Symposium on Policy 
Implications of Trade and Currency Zones, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Wonnacott, P. and M. Lutz. 1989. “Is There a Case for Free Trade Areas?” In Schott, J.J.(ed.) 
Free Trade Areas and U.S. Trade Policy, pp. 59-84. Washinton, D.C.: Inst. Int. Econ.    17
 
Table 1: Manufacturing Imports & Trade-related R&D from Each Region 
(1981-1998 average) 
 
Country  Trading Partner  Import Share (%) 
Trade-related 
R&D 
 European  Union  20.57 7.47E+07 
Korea Japan  42.93 5.32E+08 
 North  America  36.50 3.73E+08 
 European  Unoin  12.92 1.04E+08 
Mexico Japan  5.11 8.96E+07 
 North  America  81.97 2.53E+09 
 European  Union  90.74 2.81E+08 
Poland Japan  3.07 3.21E+07 
 North  America  6.20 3.31E+07 
 
Note: For Korea, Mexico and Poland, Import share from each region is defined as imports for 
manufacturing industries from a Northern region over total imports from the three Northern 
regions. Figures reported are averages for 1981-1998. Trade-related R&D from each region is 
defined as in equation (1) and figures reported are averages for 1981-1998.   18
Table 2: Determinants of TFP – Korea 
(Dependent variable: ∆lnTFP, 1977-1997) 
 
Variable (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii) 
∆logNRD
JPN  0.51  0.47       0.48  0.46 
  (2.11)**  (2.03)**       (2.01)**  (1.97)** 
∆logNRD
NA     0.02  0.01    0.00  -0.02 
     (0.19)  (0.08)    (-0.03)  (-0.19) 
∆lnNRD
EU       0.20  0.18  0.14  0.12 
         (0.89)  (0.80)  (0.63)  (0.58) 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Effects  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
F-test          
No Time Effects  17.23*** 18.29*** 17.65*** 18.80  16.99*** 18.13*** 16.91*** 18.01***
No Industry 
Effects  0.85 --- 0.76 --- 0.78 --- 0.83 --- 
Obs  336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 





EU are the first difference of the logs of trade-related technology from trading with 
Japan, North America, and the EU, respectively. Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics. The data set consists of 16 
manufacturing industries in Korea with 15 OECD trading partners, and covers 1977-1997. Regression results on constant, time 
and industry dummies are not reported.. F-tests reject (do not reject) that all the coefficients of time (industry) dummies equal 
zero.   19
Table 3: Determinants of TFP – Mexico 





EU are the first difference of the logs of trade-related technology from trading 
with Japan, North America, and the EU, respectively. Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics. The data set consists of 16 
manufacturing industries in Mexico with 15 OECD trading partners, and covers the period 1981-1998. Regression results on 
constant, time and industry dummies are not reported. F-tests reject (do not reject) that all the coefficients of time (industry) 
dummies equal zero. 
 
Variable (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii) 
∆logNRD
JPN  0.26 0.27          -0.21  -0.20 
 (0.80)  (0.89)          (-0.94)  (-0.90) 
∆logNRD
NA     0.55  0.55     0.59  0.59 
     (1.64)*  (1.67)*      (1.64)*  (1.66)* 
∆logNRD
EU          0.29 0.29 0.14 0.12 
          (0.95) (0.96) (0.52) (0.46) 
Time  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Effects  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
F-test          
No Time Effects  23.81*** 25.77**  23.54*** 26.34*** 25.46*** 28.68*** 21.08*** 22.98***
No  Industry  Effects  0.83 --- 0.38 --- 0.38 --- 0.43 --- 
Obs  272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
Adjusted  R2  0.44 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.50   20
Table 4: Determinants of TFP – Poland 
(Dependent variable: ∆lnTFP, 1981-1998)  
 
Variable (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii) 
∆logNRD
JPN  -0.55  -0.50       -0.69  -0.80 
  (-0.76)  (-0.75)       (-1.35)  (-1.56) 
∆logNRD
NA     3.19  3.17    2.26  2.24 
     (1.97)**  (2.02)**    (2.17)**  (2.21)** 
∆logNRD
EU       8.57  8.38  6.42  6.34 
       (2.08)**  (2.12)**  (2.56)*** (2.60)***
Time  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
F - t e s t           
No Time Effects  21.36*** 21.88***  6.58***  6.76***  3.94***  3.81***  2.99***  10.57*** 
No  Industry  Effects  0.38 --- 0.19 --- 0.25 --- 0.21 --- 
Obs  288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 





EU are the first difference of the logs of trade-related technology from trading with 
Japan, North America, and the EU, respectively. Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics. The data set consists of 16 
manufacturing industries in Poland with 15 OECD trading partners, and covers the period 1980-1998. Regression results on 
constant, time and industry dummies are not reported. F-tests reject (do not reject) that all the coefficients of time (industry) 
dummies equal zero. 